Treasury
3-MO 3.83% +1bp 6-MO 3.98% unch 1-YR 4.08% +4bp 2-YR 4.28% +5bp 3-YR 4.34% +4bp 5-YR 4.45% +7bp 7-YR 4.59% +7bp 10-YR 4.75% +7bp 20-YR 5.28% +6bp 30-YR 5.27% +6bp 3-MO 3.83% +1bp 6-MO 3.98% unch 1-YR 4.08% +4bp 2-YR 4.28% +5bp 3-YR 4.34% +4bp 5-YR 4.45% +7bp 7-YR 4.59% +7bp 10-YR 4.75% +7bp 20-YR 5.28% +6bp 30-YR 5.27% +6bp 3-MO 3.83% +1bp 6-MO 3.98% unch 1-YR 4.08% +4bp 2-YR 4.28% +5bp 3-YR 4.34% +4bp 5-YR 4.45% +7bp 7-YR 4.59% +7bp 10-YR 4.75% +7bp 20-YR 5.28% +6bp 30-YR 5.27% +6bp 3-MO 3.83% +1bp 6-MO 3.98% unch 1-YR 4.08% +4bp 2-YR 4.28% +5bp 3-YR 4.34% +4bp 5-YR 4.45% +7bp 7-YR 4.59% +7bp 10-YR 4.75% +7bp 20-YR 5.28% +6bp 30-YR 5.27% +6bp 3-MO 3.83% +1bp 6-MO 3.98% unch 1-YR 4.08% +4bp 2-YR 4.28% +5bp 3-YR 4.34% +4bp 5-YR 4.45% +7bp 7-YR 4.59% +7bp 10-YR 4.75% +7bp 20-YR 5.28% +6bp 30-YR 5.27% +6bp 3-MO 3.83% +1bp 6-MO 3.98% unch 1-YR 4.08% +4bp 2-YR 4.28% +5bp 3-YR 4.34% +4bp 5-YR 4.45% +7bp 7-YR 4.59% +7bp 10-YR 4.75% +7bp 20-YR 5.28% +6bp 30-YR 5.27% +6bp
US Treasury par yield curve · Jul 31 · Source: U.S. Treasury
Sunday, August 2, 2026
U.S. Edition
Kirkuk to Ceyhan

Iraq and Turkey have put a floor of 750,000 barrels a day under a pipeline to the Mediterranean, and the last federal analysis of Iraqi exports found every seaborne barrel in 2024 leaving through the Gulf

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The last federal analysis of Iraq's energy trade carries one sentence that explains why the Iraqi prime minister spent last week in Ankara. During 2024, it reads, all of Iraq's seaborne exports were shipped from the southern terminals in the Persian Gulf. Every barrel. The Energy Information Administration published that assessment in July 2025, well before the war began, and what it describes is a country whose entire seaborne crude trade depended on a single stretch of water.

Iraq and Turkey signed on Saturday. Reported by Qassim Abdul-zahra at the Associated Press, the agreement runs for one year and sets a minimum of 750,000 barrels a day through the pipeline that runs from Kirkuk in northern Iraq to the Turkish Mediterranean port of Ceyhan. Iraqi Oil Minister Bassem Mohammed Khudair al-Abadi said in a statement that the year buys time for the two governments to finish a broader framework covering oil, electricity and water resources. Iraqi Prime Minister Ali al-Zaidi called the agreement "an important strategic milestone to ensure the uninterrupted flow of our oil exports and strengthen economic cooperation."

Who signed, and what lapsed

The counterparties are state companies. Al Jazeera, whose account carries a byline crediting AFP and Reuters alongside its own staff, reports that the deal was struck between the Turkish state firm BOTAS and Iraq's SOMO and NOC, and that it comes days after the decades-old bilateral arrangement between the two countries lapsed on Monday of last week. Turkish Energy Minister Alparslan Bayraktar wrote on X that while work continues toward a new long-term agreement, the two sides had implemented a transit arrangement "covering a daily capacity of 750,000 barrels". The signing followed a meeting in Ankara between President Recep Tayyip Erdogan and al-Zaidi four days earlier.

The two accounts do not agree on what the line currently carries. Neither figure is a federal one. The Associated Press puts current flows at around 200,000 barrels a day, while Al Jazeera puts them at about 170,000 citing Turkish data and gives the pipeline a maximum capacity of about 1.5 million. This brief does not resolve the difference, because no primary document was found that settles it, and on either figure the point survives intact: the minimum agreed on Saturday is roughly four times what is moving today.

What the federal document establishes

The analysis is useful here for the size of the hole rather than for the news. Turkey stopped flows through the Iraq to Turkey pipeline in March 2023, after an international arbitration court ruled in favour of Federal Iraq and restricted Turkey from accepting crude directly from the Kurdistan Regional Government without Baghdad's permission. The route closed. Seaborne exports from northern Iraq through Ceyhan had averaged more than 400,000 barrels a day before that closure, Kurdish crude production fell from about 435,000 barrels a day in 2022 to nearly 240,000 in 2023, and Iraq's total seaborne crude exports averaged more than 3.2 million barrels a day in 2024 against nearly 3.6 million in 2022.

One smaller line in the same section is worth pulling out, because it is the part that reopens automatically. An onshore pipeline runs from the Ceyhan terminal inland to Turkey's Kirikkale refinery near Ankara, rated at 145,000 barrels a day, and the analysis records that Iraqi exports to that refinery stopped and stay stopped until the main pipeline resumes. A working Ceyhan is therefore two customers, not one.

Where the crude would go is a settled question. Asia took 72 percent of Iraq's crude exports in 2024, led by China at more than 1.1 million barrels a day and India at nearly 900,000, the two of them accounting for 62 percent between them. European countries took 21 percent. A Mediterranean outlet is the short route to the second group.

What has not been published

No text of the agreement has been released by either government. The Iraqi Oil Ministry site returns a near-empty shell, the Turkish Energy Ministry serves the same JavaScript application on every path, and BOTAS, the named Turkish signatory, has posted nothing at all: the newest item in its news feed is dated 1 June 2026 and the newest announcement 2 March 2026. What stands in place of a document is two ministers, a prime minister, a wire report and a post on X.

The Associated Press also reports that the two governments are weighing a further line, running from Basra in southern Iraq to Haditha in the west and on to both Ceyhan and the Syrian port of Baniyas. That one is under consideration and nothing more. It is recorded here because it is the route that would actually take southern crude out of the Gulf, and it is the one to watch rather than the one signed on Saturday.

Where we read it: Qassim Abdul-zahra at The Associated Press. Read their story.

The document: US Energy Information Administration, Country Analysis Brief: Iraq, US Department of Energy, Washington DC, 25 pages, cover page reading 'Last Updated: July 14, 2025', page footers reading 'July 2025 U.S. Energy Information Administration | Country Analysis Brief: Iraq'. The PDF was downloaded (HTTP 200, 904,241 bytes, application/pdf) and its text extracted and read rather than summarised, and every figure below was matched against that extracted text and not against any fetch-tool description of it. Sentences verified verbatim in the Energy Trade section: 'During 2024, all of Iraq's seaborne exports were shipped from the southern terminals in the Persian Gulf, which export Basra medium and heavy crude oil grades'; 'Iraq's total seaborne-traded crude oil exports averaged more than 3.2 million barrels per day (b/d) in 2024, which is lower than the nearly 3.6 million b/d in 2022, based on tanker loadings data'; 'Seaborne oil exports from northern Iraq through the Turkish port of Ceyhan terminal averaged more than 400,000 b/d before the ITP closure in March 2023'; 'The Ceyhan-Kirikkale pipeline has a capacity of 145,000 b/d' and 'Iraq's exports to the Kirikkale refinery have stopped until the ITP pipeline resumes operations'; 'Operational export capacity was about 3.4 million b/d in mid-2024'; 'Türkiye stopped crude oil flows through the Iraq-to-Türkiye (ITP) pipeline in March 2023 when an international arbitration court ruled in favor of Federal Iraq'; 'KRG crude oil production fell from about 435,000 barrels per day (b/d) in 2022 to nearly 240,000 b/d in 2023'; and 'Asia (led by India, China, and South Korea) was the main regional destination for Iraq's crude oil and imported 72% of Iraq's crude oil exports in 2024', with China above 1.1 million b/d, India near 900,000 b/d, 62 percent between them, and Europe at 21 percent. Note the document's own vintage, which is stated twice in the body: it was last updated 14 July 2025 and contains no mention of any resumption of ITP flows, which is consistent with it predating the limited restart the Associated Press describes. It is therefore a pre-war baseline and is offered as one. The second EIA document referenced in 'What it changes' is the Today in Energy chokepoint analysis at https://www.eia.gov/todayinenergy/detail.php?id=61002, retrieved separately this cycle (HTTP 200) and re-read rather than taken from this desk's own earlier brief, per rulebook section 2a, which applies to our own prior summaries as well as to other people's. Verified verbatim there: oil flow through the Strait of Hormuz 'averaged 21 million barrels per day (b/d), or the equivalent of about 21% of global petroleum liquids consumption' in 2022; and 'We estimate that around 3.5 million b/d of effective unused capacity from these pipelines could be available to bypass the strait in the event of a supply disruption', where the antecedent of 'these pipelines' is, in the same passage, the Saudi east-west line, the 1.5 million b/d UAE line to Fujairah, and Iran's 0.3 million b/d Goreh-Jask line, all of which reach the Gulf of Oman. That antecedent is why this brief states the Iraq-Turkey line sits alongside the 3.5 million rather than inside it, and the distinction is the desk's arithmetic on the document rather than a claim the document makes. There is no public text of the agreement signed on Saturday. The Iraqi Oil Ministry site returned a 2,629 byte shell, the Turkish Energy Ministry at enerji.gov.tr returned an identical 3,719 byte JavaScript application shell on every path tried including /news and /haberler, and BOTAS, the named Turkish counterparty, has published nothing: its Haberler feed was retrieved (HTTP 200) and its newest item is dated 1 Haziran 2026, that is 1 June 2026, with the newest Duyurular announcement dated 02.03.2026. The body says all of this explicitly rather than implying documentation the desk does not have. Wire verification chain, with JSON-LD extracted and the dates read before any body text per section 2a: Associated Press, apnews.com with full browser headers, HTTP 200, NewsArticle datePublished and dateModified both 2026-08-01T17:40:14Z, bylined Qassim Abdul-zahra, dateline BAGHDAD. Al Jazeera, HTTP 200, NewsArticle datePublished and dateModified both 2026-08-01T16:43:34Z, byline 'Al Jazeera Staff, AFP and Reuters', which is noted in the body because two of those three contributors are outlets this desk cannot fetch directly and the reader is entitled to know the provenance of the BOTAS, SOMO and NOC detail and of the Bayraktar quotation. The National, HTTP 200, NewsArticle datePublished 2026-08-01T13:41:27.193Z, dateModified 2026-08-01T14:15:22.523Z, bylined Fareed Rahman, headlined 'Iraq to sign extension of pipeline deal with Turkey', which is the pre-signing story and is not relied on for anything asserted here. One substantive conflict between the two usable wire accounts is reported in the body rather than resolved: the Associated Press puts current pipeline flows at around 200,000 barrels a day, Al Jazeera puts them at about 170,000 citing Turkish data, and no federal or other primary document was found that settles which is right. A search-layer result at discoveryalert.com.au was ignored as not meeting the sourcing hierarchy in rulebook section 3, and a malaymail item describing a 2025 restart of the Kurdistan pipeline was checked and set aside as a different event from a different year..